题目：Pro-Manufacturing Land Policies of Competing Local Governments: A Quantitative Analysis of China

摘要：Local government policies can correct market inefficiencies but are also shaped by spatial  political economy considerations. We study the rationale and impact of local land policies in China, where local governments have a de facto monopoly in regional urban land markets and exhibit a pronounced pro-manufacturing land allocation across sectors. We develop a multi-sector quantitative spatial equilibrium model where local governments compete noncooperatively through local land policies. Calibrating and simulating the model, we find that the observed policies are, on average, comparable to the Nash policy when local governments maximize manufacturing output. This result reveals a manufacturing bias in the observed land policies. When local governments instead prioritize maximizing local real income per capita,we find that the land allocation to manufacturing still considerably exceeds that in a competitive market. However, this pro-manufacturing policy results in higher local real income per capita across regions. Finally, when considering the goal of maximizing national average real income per capita, we find that the non-cooperative outcome is nearly as effective as the cooperative equilibrium.

时间：10月18日上午10：00

地点：36365线路检测中心6-210会议室

嘉宾简介：

奚锡灿，复旦大学36365线路检测中心长聘副教授，研究领域为宏观经济学、发展经济学和环境经济学。研究论文曾发表于PNAS、AEJ:Macro、JEDC、CJE、《经济研究》、《管理世界》和《世界经济》等国内外学术期刊。