报告时间：2024年6月6日（周四）上午10：00

报告地点：文化中心305会议室

主讲人：宁波诺丁汉大学，陈滢博士；复旦大学，武宇婷博士

陈滢博士：Endogenous Network Formation in Local Public Goods: An experimental analysis

摘 要：We experimentally explore public good production levels, and the endogenous formation of network structures to facilitate output sharing, among agents with heterogeneous production costs or valuations. Results corroborate the key theoretical insights of Kinateder & Merlino (2017) characterizing how agents form core-periphery networks. However, subjects often produce more and form denser networks than predicted, which sometimes reduces efficiency. There is some tendency for behaviour to converge towards the theoretical equilibrium over repeated play. Our results help us understand the emergence of the ‘law of the few’ in real-world networks, and suggest it is driven by endogenous sorting of heterogeneous agents.

武宇婷博士：A Promise Mechanism to Improve Reputation System in Markets: Evidence from An Experimental Study

摘 要：We design and test a simple promise mechanism aimed at addressing the common challenge of insufficient feedback provision in reputation systems in online markets. Before a transaction, a buyer is given an opportunity to make promises regarding his or her willingness to leave feedback. We examine the following two distinct mechanisms of soliciting promises: market promise solicitation, where the market automatically prompts buyers to decide whether to commit to providing feedback to sellers after the transaction, and seller promise solicitation, where the sellers themselves request promises from buyers. Theoretically, both methods may effectively improve the reporting rate and market efficiency. Data analysis from a controlled laboratory experiment shows that seller promise solicitation, but not market promise solicitation, generates higher reporting and purchasing rates, resulting in greater market efficiency. The outperformance of seller promise solicitation aligns with the expectation-based motivation theory of promise-keeping.